Scalable, Transparent, and Post-Quantum Secure Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Bentov, Yinon Horesh, Michael Riabzev
Abstract
This foundational paper, often associated with the STARK (Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge) construction, outlines a method for generating zero-knowledge proofs that are both transparent and post-quantum secure. The authors propose the use of FRI (Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive Proofs) to achieve proof systems that do not rely on the hardness of discrete logarithms or elliptic curve assumptions, which are vulnerable to future quantum computing. By focusing on computational integrity, the STARK construction provides a scalable mechanism for verifying arbitrary computations through the use of algebraic complexity theory and hashes. The significance of this work lies in its resilience against quantum attacks and its departure from the trusted setup requirement, which has historically been a point of vulnerability in proof systems. The methodology creates a paradigm shift in how off-chain computations are verified on-chain, offering a robust infrastructure for high-throughput, private, and quantum-resistant blockchain applications.
Key Findings
- 1Introduces the STARK protocol as a quantum-resistant alternative to SNARKs.
- 2Demonstrates proof generation that is transparent, eliminating the need for a trusted setup.
- 3Leverages hash-based primitives, moving away from vulnerable elliptic curve cryptography.
- 4Provides a methodology for near-instant verification of large-scale computational batches.
Topics
Citation
BibTeX
@misc{scalabletransparent2018,
title = {Scalable, Transparent, and Post-Quantum Secure Zero-Knowledge Proofs},
author = {Eli Ben-Sasson and Iddo Bentov and Yinon Horesh and Michael Riabzev},
year = {2018},
howpublished = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/046}},
}Knowledge Explorer
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