Voting Schemes in DAO Governance
Q. Ding
Abstract
This chapter provides an exhaustive analysis of the various voting schemes currently employed in decentralized governance, ranging from simple majority rule to complex liquid democracy models. The author evaluates each mechanism based on its resilience to attack, voter participation rates, and fairness. By applying game-theoretic models, the paper highlights how specific voting rules can be manipulated by malicious actors and suggests defenses such as commit-reveal schemes and time-weighted voting. The work is particularly valuable for protocol architects who must select or customize voting mechanisms to suit their community's needs. It moves beyond standard models to discuss the potential for future innovations like soulbound tokens and identity-linked voting to solve the inherent flaws in current token-based systems.
Key Findings
- 1Different voting schemes have vastly different impacts on protocol security and decentralization.
- 2Time-weighted voting can effectively prioritize long-term stakeholders over short-term speculators.
- 3Liquid democracy offers a promising, though complex, alternative to direct voting in large communities.
- 4Game theory indicates that no voting scheme is immune to all forms of collusion, necessitating defense-in-depth strategies.
Topics
Citation
BibTeX
@misc{votingschemes2025,
title = {Voting Schemes in DAO Governance},
author = {Q. Ding},
year = {2025},
howpublished = {\url{https://ideas.repec.org/h/wsi/wschap/9789819806751_0008.html}},
}Knowledge Explorer
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